and civic or non-electoral participation (Hickerson 2013) . The movement which came hot on the heels of kindred mobilisations against the SOPA (Stop Online Piracy) and PIPA (Protest IP Act) proposed bills in the US, fundamentally disputed the utility of the transnational treaty when set against its implications for freedom of speech (Losey 2014) . More widely, opposition to the ACTA agreement berated the opaqueness of treaty negotiations, the closed-door proceedings and the apparent suspension of democratic principles of broad public consultations for the benefit of ever-encroaching corporate interests on institutional politics (cf. Crouch 2004) . In the same way as other preceding (della Porta et al. 2006) and contemporary movements such as the Indignados or Occupy (della Porta 2013), Stop ACTA advocated robust participatory mechanisms and accountability principles to be placed firmly at the heart of contemporary transnational policy (Losey 2014 ).
This chapter reports on a renewed capacity for the coordination of collective action and the critical scrutiny of institutional actors by a crowd of actors assembled on social media and then in town squares on 12 June 2012, the last day of EU-wide actions called by the Stop ACTA movement. These were individuals, ad-hoc or ethereal groups, whose routine operations take place wholly within the material infrastructure of the internet that Karpf (2012: 1) suggestively termed 'organisations without organisations', fringe political actors such as The Pirate Party and other activist cause groups. These actors were far removed from established organisations -insider advocacy groups or political parties -whose staff are familiar faces on the corridors of power in Brussels. Their activity on Facebook and Twitter further revealed both limited access and interest in tapping organisational resources from more established but ideologically compatible peers such as the Electronic Freedom Foundation who spearheaded the drive against the ACTA agreement at the EU institutional level (Lischka 2010) . Instead, a sizable proportion of the communication witnessed on both social media platforms concentrated on the crowd-sourcing of requisite resources for collective action and the articulation of a critical and by-and-large reasoned discourse providing a cohesive justification for the protest (Mercea and Funk 2014; Mercea 2015) . Accordingly, the discursiveness encountered on social media may be regarded as adding to the eventfulness of the 9 June demonstrations. Eventfulness amounts to 'cognitive, affective and relational impacts [of protest events] on the very movements that carry them out ' (della Porta 2008:30) . In what follows, I outline how the opposition to the ACTA agreement grew in impetus in 2012 and the opportunities this particular mobilisation provided for visiting and extending the developing field of research into connective action (Bennett and Segerberg 2012) and informal civic learning by social movements (Rogers and Haggerty 2013) Made public prior to ratification, the agreement was met with intense criticism on grounds that it encroached on fundamental rights and freedoms as well as extant norms on data protection (Metzger and Matulionyte 2011) . Despite mounting challenges to it, the EU became a signatory to the agreement in Tokyo on 26 January 2012. Procedurally, it was envisaged that 'once the European Parliament has given its consent, and the national ratification process in the Member States are completed, the Council of Ministers then has to adopt a final decision to conclude the agreement' (European Commission 2012).
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The opposition to ACTA gained momentum soon after the agreement was signed. In the EU, the first protests took place in February 2012. Concerted demonstrations continued across the Union in the months to follow culminating with a final instalment on 9 June 2012 in the run-up to the vote by the European Parliament on the ratification of the agreement in early July that year. Rising against the agreement was a spectrum of formal organisations, informal groups and individuals who took their fight to various fora. Among those actors, a split was apparent along an outsider/insider strategy fault line (Maloney et al. 1994) . On the one hand, there were advocacy campaigns directed at EU policy institutions and networks spearheaded by civil society organisations (Losey, 2014) . Formal organisations such as Consumers International, the Electronic Frontier Foundation petitioned the European Parliament (Lischka 2010 ) and met with EU officials (European Commission 2012). The Stop-ACTA protests occurred at the intersection of national and supra-national European politics. They exposed a mode of cosmopolitan citizenship in the making for some time in the global process of neoliberal individualisation. In the dominant neoliberal global climate, the individual has been simultaneously the central subject of both unfettered market relations and of a universalizing human rights regime (Beck 2000: 83) . Cosmopolitan citizenship may embody a de-territorialised democratic political culture (Dahlgren 2006) which, as in the case of Stop ACTA, seeks to instil new accountability and legitimacy into the expansive terrain of global economic governance (Micheletti 2003) . Against this background, studying the Stop ACTA movement was an opportunity to tackle the questions of whether and how collective action 1 is orchestrated, by whom and with what cultural and political imprint on the intricate institutional architecture of the European Union.
Participatory coordination and informal civic learning
Social movement protest has often been portrayed as an outward collective expression of high emotions that preclude the discursive rationality of democratic institutions and procedures (Polletta and Jasper 2001) . There is, nevertheless, a stubborn proclivity for protest participation in liberal democracies (Saunders et al. 2012) . Indeed, an orientation towards direct action on topical issues (environmental degradation, austerity, job security or social benefits) seems to have gained ground through a combination of greater civic knowledge -especially among the younger generations (Galston 2001 ) -a penchant for involvement in civil society groups intent on enacting social change and the leveraging of Internet technologies for political activism (Dalton 2008) . The last of the foregoing claims has been disavowed in some quarters, digital communication being depicted as a displacement from more far-reaching engagement in either institutional politics or the act of protest (Skoric 2012) . Slacktivism is a stock term capturing this mood predicated on a normativity of participation that remains to be systematically verified with empirical research (Halupka 2014) . To this end, the chapter adds to the evidence base on the study of networked communication associated with social movement protest.
A first step in that direction was to engage with the theory of connective action (Bennett and Segerberg 2012) . Connective action networks are a modality of ground-up cooperative organisation pivoting on networked communication with social media or other bespoke
Internet-based activist applications and the cultural practice of sharing user-generated content through trusted social relationships (Bennett and Segerberg 2012: 753) . This organisational modality may be an alternative avenue whereby requisite resources for collective action are mustered communicatively by a self-organising crowd (Aguilera et al. 2013) . Illustratively, the Occupy Wall Street Movement was a hotbed for concerted peer-production through the medium of Twitter which was generative of 'coherent organisation' (Bennett, Segerberg and Walker 2014: 234) . This was achieved through the production, curation and integration of information and resources accessible to those involved in the protest-related networked communication. Narrowly defined, resource mobilisation represents the cultural task of extracting 'usable resources from a population', the most palpable of which is money (Jasper 1997: 31) .
Secondly, the motivation or 'desire to achieve a goal, combined with the energy to work toward that goal' (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010: 179) is an upshot of the interplay between an individual's cognitions and emotions pertaining to involvement in collective action and a sense of identification with an aggrieved reference group. Structurally, motivation may arise through networked communication as social information about the readiness of peers to undertake collective action is retrieved on social media (Margetts et al. 2012; Hallam 2015) .
Personal action frames have been described as a key vehicle for instilling the motivation to partake in collective action (Bennett and Segerberg 2012) . They encompass 'different personal reasons for contesting a situation that needs to be changed' (Bennett and Segerberg 2012: 744) .
Personal action frames are unlike stable group identities and ideologies, which are organisational paraphernalia one embraces whenever joining organisationally orchestrated collective action (Bennett and Segerberg 2012: 746) . This distributed modality for instilling the motivation and raising resources for collective action we termed participatory coordination (Mercea and Funk 2014) . Facebook and Twitter exchanges may amount to civic literacy events so long as participants circulate action-oriented knowledge whilst reflecting on political institutions, media organisations and their own actions in the run-up to social movement protests (Mercea 2015) .
Below, I discuss these suppositions in light of findings from the Stop ACTA research project.
Findings
The research on participatory coordination and informal (Rosen et al. 2010 ).
In the last instance, as a control variable testing the prospect of EU-wide diffusion of collective practices such as participatory coordination, language revealed a lop-sided distribution of participatory coordination. The practice appeared more prevalent among some language groups (e.g. Austrian, Danish and Polish on Facebook, German on Twitter) than others (e.g. the Spanish groups). Aside from the above exceptions, however, language remained largely immaterial to participatory coordination.
The Stop ACTA discourse encountered on the two social media displayed not only a long attested concern with the enactment of collective action and participation therein (Juris 2012; Theocharis et al. 2015) but also an ingrained preoccupation with institutional politicsboth national and of the European Union -and their reform through the instigation of concrete changes, namely to accountability rules within the EU. This discourse was marked by an interconnection of several topical discursive objects. Firstly, there was a large proportion of both emotional outbursts and reasoned appraisals of mainstream politics and the media which were often accompanied by thoughts about hands-on modalities of remedying their perceived shortcomings. Thus, resonant personal action frames could be distinguished across individual comments. Such frames exhibited, for instance, a preoccupation with action and participation that was closely associated with exchanges of civic knowledge about the institutional context of collective action that informed the critique of the latter critique and ultimately its challenge.
There was, nonetheless, a conspicuous absence of references to mainstream parties or interest groups (mentioned only a handful of times on Twitter, and there largely as an object of criticism). The fact was interpreted as a post-structural dissolution of participant ties with traditional representative organisations (see Dalton 2008) .
The protestors' relationship with mainstream media was largely perceived as fraught.
Such assessments were twinned with calls for the self-generation of activist media to maximise the public impact of the collective action. Illustratively, civic knowledge and a critique of the media were co-articulated in a post bemoaning the manner in which the German public broadcaster ARD covered the Stop ACTA campaign. The author averred the TV channel's prejudiced portrayal of the extra-parliamentarian opposition to the agreement as uninformed, maintaining that a publically-funded media organisation ought to engage impartially with the substantive political issues at stake (i.e. copyright protection). Ultimately, in their drive to give the activist side of the story, the Stop ACTA campaigners were continuing a long-standing tradition of alternative media production (Segerberg and Bennett 2011; Poell 2014: 721) .
Lastly, comments pertaining to civic participation featured in posts calling for renewed reflexivity on the fundamental principles of democratic governance seemingly eroded by mainstream politics. As a redress, inter alia, one author invited fellow citizens to take collective action as a way to reassert the primacy of popular referenda as a participatory institution of contemporary democracy. Notably, throughout the analysis, no posts were found on either Facebook or Twitter proposing the abandonment of extant democratic politics and an exit from its institutional framework (Hirschman 1970) . Notwithstanding, some of the postees urged for a retrenchment within the boundaries of the democratic nation state as a counterweight to ACTA and similar encroachments of international neoliberal regimes best epitomised by the EU. The observed disaffection with institutional politics thereby evoked a long-standing perception among the EU citizenry that member states were no longer 'governed by the will of the people' (Castells 2007: 244) . In this respect, the Stop ACTA mobilisation aligned with movements in the wave of anti-austerity uprisings since the start of the decade such as the Indignados or the Occupy Movement. These demanded a more participatory settlement in contemporary liberal democracy which would put the populace firmly at the heart of deliberative processes whilst opening up more avenues for participation over and above elections (see della Porta 2013).
Conclusions
The participatory The talk about institutional politics ultimately informed the planned Stop ACTA actions. It formed an abstract groundwork on which protestors would be able to construct their motivation, the civic knowledge and skills to oppose the international agreement. The noted critical stance towards government, comprehending the EU institutions, laid bare complex institutional workings for activists to be able to take informed action against them. The case of Stop ACTA, nevertheless, does not completely discount the possibility of slacktivism.
Indeed, there is evidence that the use of social media will not expand the knowledge of government and political organisations among the general public (Dimitrova et al. 2014) . One may, however, cast one's analysis back to the study of the cultural work done by social movements in the attempt to sensitise the public at large to their causes (see Eyerman and Jamison 1991) . Under that light, the discourse weaved together by the opposition to the ACTA agreement on social media may be viewed as a key means whereby in a cognitive field marked by entrenched power asymmetries between social movement and institutional actors, Stop ACTA staked its counter-claim against the global trade regime envisaged in the international agreement.
Cutting across the cognitive field encompassing the ACTA agreement was a tension between the cosmopolitanism of the opposition and the hegemonic trade regime regarded as a threat to democracy. Some voices on social media designated parliamentary sovereignty as a counterbalance to that regime. Indeed, the refusal by the Dutch Parliament to ratify ACTA which led to the rescindment of the agreement verified the effectiveness of political subsidiarity -the principle that decisions are to be taken closest to the citizen -in the EU (European Parliament 2015) . A question for further research is whether collective practices such as the ones reported here substantiate the idea that social movements animated by an EU-wide ethos contribute to the Europeanisation of contention (cf. Guiraudon 2011) . The case of the Stop ACTA mobilisation corroborates the claim by Guiraudon (2011: 135) that all levels of governance including the European one are part of an opportunity structure that nongovernmental organisations will differentially try to seize upon to advance their causes.
The opposition to ACTA on social media threw into relief the vital link that exists between digital media and embodied collective action, to wit street demonstrations (see Bastos et al. 2015) . In addition, it further illustrated the practices whereby networked communication feeds into vital social movement processes such as coordination, mobilisation or identitybuilding that culminate with street demonstrations and other material forms of protest.
Apprehension remains as to whether the potential for timely aggregation of sizeable bodies of protestors through the medium of networked communication can amount to more than momentary effervescence. Mindful observers (Juris 2012: 274) have stressed that the rapid scalability of demonstrations with social media is far from a definitive nostrum for effecting political and cultural change. Conversely, the Stop ACTA case can be read as a literacy event whereby exchanges on social media were the building blocks of an action repertoire and knowledge resources that fed into a critique of mainstream political institutions and the media.
Thereby, beyond the immediate goal to forestall the ratification of the ACTA agreement, the Stop ACTA protest carried the seeds of a slower-burning and elusive but nevertheless significant process of reaffirming democratic values 3 . Lastly, the activist talk encountered on social media helped compound the eventfulness (della Porta 2008) of the 9 June mobilisation by making visible cardinal ideas and sentiments that underpinned the opposition that took to the streets on that day of action.
